than its neighbors both because its financial system was in better shape than others around the region, and because it had a uniquely low vulnerability to contagion. In particular, the Philippines had already had its financial crises and as a consequence had undertaken measures to strengthen its domestic financial system. This observation is at once both trite and profound: it suggests both that backsliding on the part of the Philippines could lead to renewed problems and, that with respect to the benefits of financial market reform, the other countries around the world might have something to learn from the sick man.
The Fundamentalist Creed
There are two principal economic theories or explanations for the Asian financial crisis: one that emphasizes the weakness of economic fundamentals, especially in the financial sector, and the other that emphasizes panic or international contagion on the part of financial market investors.1 The relevant "fundamentals" relate both to such internal and external factors as international trade competitiveness.2 Working from large global data bases on the financial crises, empirical research by Tornell and Goldstein, Reinhart, and Kaminsky identify a fairly robust set of predictors of banking or currency crises; these include rapid real exchange rate appreciation over trend; decline in equity prices; decline in export revenues; a high ratio of the domestic money stock to foreign exchange reserves, lending booms, decline in output, and a large current account deficit relative to national income or investment.3
How did the Philippines stack up in 1997? Not too well on these measures. The country began experiencing a nominal exchange rate appreciation in 1992 after its foreign exchange market was liberalized; eventually, the central bank would undertake a variety of measures including relaxation of capital outflow restrictions, repayment of some foreign debts at an accelerated rate, and sterilization interventions in the currency market in an attempt to . In some models, the panicked investors would not necessarily be foreign investorsdomestic capital flight could be another source of large rapid international capital movements.
2. In principle, one could further try to separate "internal" and "external" sources of fundamental strength or weakness. However, in practice they are typically interrelated: for example, real exchange rate overvaluation often leads to lending booms in domestic non-tradables such as real estate. MARCUS NOLAND 403 limit the appreciation.4 These actions in turn encouraged the growth of the domestic money supply relative to foreign exchange reserves-another indicator of incipient financial crisis. The associated real exchange rate appreciation contributed to a modest slowdown in Philippine export revenues, though it is hard to disentangle how much of this was due to reduced export volumes and how much was due to falling prices.5 The Philippines did experience some mild adverse terms of trade shocks in the period before the crisis in the form of reduced prices for electronics exports and a variety of commodity ones. The current account deficit widened from less than 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1992 to between 4%-5% of GDP thereafter, despite a significant growth in revenues from remittances. The merchandise trade deficit exhibited an even more dramatic increase than the broader current account measure.
With regard to its internal fundamentals, the Philippines experienced an enormous lending boom in the 1990s. Bank lending to the private sector as a share of GDP more than doubled between 1990 and 1997. The stock market peaked in January 1997 and proceeded to fall by nearly 25% over the next six months. By most of the robust predictors of financial crisis, the Philippines was an accident waiting to happen. Indeed, Goldstein, Reinhart, and Kaminsky report an experiment in which they used an econometric model to predict the out-of-sample vulnerability of 19 countries to financial crises. On the basis of the indicators for the period January 1996 to January 1997, the five countries most likely to experience a crisis were South Africa, the Czech Republic, Thailand, South Korea, and the Philippines. All except South Africa subsequently did experience crises. For the more inclusive period of January 1996 to December 1997, their model identified the countries most likely to experience a crisis as being the Czech Republic, South Korea, Thailand, South Africa, and Colombia. Again, South Africa was the only one that did not experience a crisis. The surprise is not that the Asian countries, including the Philippines, experienced crises-it was that South Africa did not.6 The bottom line is that the Philippine crisis could have been predicted on the basis of weak fundamentals. Crisis Performance Yet, as can be seen in Table 1 , the deviation between the Philippines's forecast growth rate in 1998 and its actual performance was by far the smallest of the Asian countries. This was not simply a matter of luck: the forecast revisions were also the smallest, indicating that the forecasters believed that the Philippines was likely to be the least affected of the Asian countries. There are essentially two explanations: first, that the Philippine financial sector was stronger than others around the region, and second, that the Philippines was uniquely insulated from regional contagion. Historically, the Philippines had a relatively repressed and inefficient financial system. Williamson and Mahar surveyed the financial systems of 34 countries, rating them on six dimensions: credit controls, interest rates, entry barriers, bank autonomy, privatization, and international capital flows. In each case the Philippine banking sector of the 1970s received a grade of "repressed" or "partly repressed."7 Hutchcroft further described the Philippine banking sector as characterized by "rampant favoritism" and "inefficient state regulation."8 (This is, after all, the country that gave us the term "crony capitalism.") As a consequence, the country's financial sector did a poor job MARCUS NOLAND 405 of mobilizing saving and allocating capital, and was prone to instability, experiencing crises in the mid-1970s, early 1980s, and mid-1980s.9 (Sadly, by experiencing crises under conditions of both capital account openness and closure, the Philippines proved that "hot money" international capital flows may be a sufficient, though not a necessary, condition for financial meltdown.) The formal banking sector was essentially an urban phenomenon-in the rural areas wealth was predominately held in non-monetary forms. Barriers to entry and regulatory forbearance contributed to cartelization of the banking sector and the consequent super-normal profits to those lucky enough to obtain a banking license.
The Philippine government undertook a number of significant reforms of the real side of the economy in the 1980s, equalizing incentives across different activities; this process continued into the 1990s. There had been a number of attempts to change the financial system, but it was not until that decade that significant reform was achieved. Initially, entry barriers were modestly relaxed, with the number of branches increasing from 1,957 at the end of 1990, to 3,175 at the end of 1995.10 This was followed by a period of reform during 1993-95 in which the central bank was rehabilitated, commercial banks were forced to increase their capitalization ratios, new foreign and domestic entrants were allowed to enter the market, and the quality of prudential regulation was strengthened. The result was an increase in competition that eroded some oligopoly profits, promoted the mobilization of saving, and encouraged financial deepening. So, for example, the ratio of money and quasi-money to national income, which had been rising steadily since 1986 accelerated its increase, more than doubling from 23% to 49% between 1986 and 1996.
Not only was the amount of finance increasing, so was its quality. As noted earlier, reforms begun in the 1980s had significantly equalized incentives across activities. The financial sector reforms that opened the banking system to new domestic and foreign entrants contributed to a managerial and technological upgrading of the system, in part driven by a reverse brain drain of returning Filipino bankers who had been employed outside the Philippines by foreign banks. Together, these reforms combined generated a more efficient pattern of investment. Table 2 reports changes in the incremental capital-output ratio, an admittedly crude indicator of investment efficiency. As countries develop, capital deepening occurs, and one would expect the incremental capital output ratio Cl~~~~~~~~~~~~~d'" Q-) to rise (i.e., as more capital-intensive techniques of production are adopted, the amount of investment needed to produce a unit of output increases). Instead, the data for the Philippines show a fall in the incremental capital-output ratio. That is to say, the Philippines was getting significantly more "bang for the buck" in the mid-1990s than it had a decade earlier.
Indeed, on a variety of financial market indicators, on the eve of the crisis, the Philippine financial system looked more solid than did others in Asia (Tables 3 and 4) . Although the Philippines experienced a domestic credit boom in the mid-1990s, it went on for a shorter duration than those elsewhere in Asia. So, for example, the Philippine banking sector appears to have been less over-lent than others in Asia on the eve of the crisis in aggregate terms. Moreover, the quality of bank lending appears to have been higher as well: exposure to the real estate sector was lower, collateral valuations were lower, and capital adequacy was higher. Non-performing loans were lower going into the crisis and increased less once the crisis was underway. This is not to say that the Philippine financial sector was perfect: as Williamson and Mahar observed, despite the abolition of directed credit, commercial banks remained dependent on the central bank's discount window providing a mechanism for the government to influence lending, and cartel price-fixing practices had not been eradicated, despite new entries into the market.11 Nor have subsequent events demonstrated that the financial system is free of taint. Rather, this is only to say that the Philippine system looked good relative to those elsewhere in Asia.
The lower real estate exposure, in particular, turned out to be important.12 As Hutchcroft pointed out, because of the higher interest rates prevailing in the Philippines, property developers were forced to adopt more conservative approaches to financing and were less over-leveraged than their Thai counterparts.13 This was reinforced in June 1997 when the central bank imposed In the case of Thailand, two critical sectors have been weakened because of over-capacity: real estate and banking. Real estate suffers from over-capacity: too many units have been built in relation to actual and potential demand. The financial sector, which was over-extended to the real estate sector, suffers from a high rate of past due loans in their overall loan portfolio. In the Philippines, the real estate sector is far from being overbuilt. The occupancy rate in prime commercial areas is very high, at more than 95%, and real estate as a sector accounts for less than 15% of the loan portfolio of the banking system. In fact, based on all the information available, both confidential and non-confidential, the Philippines banking system is solid. ceilings on banks' loan exposure to the real estate sector and the permissible collateral valuation of real estate security.14 As a consequence, the Philippines (and South Korea) were distinct in that to a significant extent the domestic lending boom financed overcapacity in internationally traded-goods sectors, rather than non-tradables such as real estate. Moreover, the Philippine corporate sector was less over-leveraged than elsewhere in Asia (see Table 5 ). This difference in the sectoral pattern of lending had implications for how the economy was able to respond to the crisis. When the exchange rate collapsed, the country experienced a significant real exchange rate depreciation, as did other countries in Southeast Asia. However, to a greater extent than it had in the others, the lending boom in the Philippines had financed invest-14. These restrictions were tightened immediately upon the commencement of the crisis in July 1997. At the same time, the central bank imposed new liquidity requirements on foreign currency liabilities and removed tax disincentives on peso deposits. ment in internationally tradable sectors. Because of excess capacity in the tradables sector and less impairment of corporate balance sheets, the Philippines was better able to exploit the real exchange rate depreciation and increased exports (as well as substituting domestically produced goods for imports). As a consequence, the Philippines was able to generate the big reduction in its current account deficit through exporting (and thereby maintaining the level of domestic output), rather than through a compression of imports. 15
Yet, fundamentals are only half of the story. What about contagion? There are essentially two channels. One is through international trade. If one country devalues its currency, then other countries competing against it in world markets have been relatively disadvantaged (i.e., they have experienced a real exchange rate appreciation). It is not necessary that the countries compete against one another in each others' markets-in fact, the competition is likely to occur in third country markets. So, for example, when Thailand devalued the baht, Philippine exporters were disadvantaged in the U.S. and Japanese markets. Thus, a devaluation by one country can lead to pressure for competitive devaluations by other, similarly situated countries.
The second channel for contagion is through the financial markets. There is a growing academic literature that seeks to provide theoretical explanations of herd-like behavior on the part of investors. 16 The empirical evidence on the determinants of contagion is conflicting: Glick and Rose found that trade links do a better job than herding in explaining contagion, while Choe, Kho, and Stulz as well as Kim and Wei provided evidence to suggest that prior to the crisis, foreign investors tended to be herding, positive feed-back traders. 17 With respect to the trade channel, Noland et al. showed that the devaluations elsewhere in Southeast Asia had only a modest impact on the Philippine balance of payments position.18 Moreover, the Philippines appeared to have been less vulnerable to financial market contagion than its neighbors for reasons of both policy and luck. Because of the country's experience during the debt crisis of the 1980s, its policy makers appeared to be particularly riskaverse, especially with regard to short-term, fixed interest-rate bank debt.19 At the onset of the crisis, Philippine debt indicators were better than its neighbors (see Table 5 ). In particular, compared to its neighbors, the Philippines had relatively less exposure to Japanese bank lending. This was due both to low levels of Japanese foreign direct investment in the Philippines relative to other Southeast Asian countries (Japanese banks tended to follow their domestic clients into foreign countries) and policies that had encouraged non-Japanese banks into the Philippine market. The presence of non-Japanese banks and their competitive advantages over Japanese banks tended to crowd out Japanese lending to non-Japanese borrowers. This would become important in the fall of 1997, when the weakness of Japanese banks caused them to begin refusing to roll-over loans and even calling in existing ones.20 At the same time, due to the Philippines's historically weak economic performance relative to its neighbors (despite its relatively developed and open capital markets), it was underweighted in the Morgan Stanley Capital International Far East Ex-Japan Free Index, the benchmark against which the performance of mutual funds investing in emerging market Asia is usually compared.21 Mutual fund managers tend to stick fairly closely to the index in their country allocations, so as a consequence, the Philippines had relatively less exposure to foreign mutual fund managers. Again, this meant that the Philippines had relatively less exposure to international "hot money" flows than did others in the region.
Goldstein, Reinhart, and Kaminsky use an econometric model to attempt to integrate quantitatively the two basic contributing factors to the occurrence of a financial crisis: weak fundamentals and contagion. They find that while the dominant cause of the financial crisis in Indonesia was contagion, it played virtually no role in the Philippines (see Table 6 ).22 The Philippine crisis was almost entirely home grown.
Conclusions
The Philippines has long been regarded as the weak sister of Asia, but in the Asian financial crisis it performed relatively well. This is not simply a matter of not being able to fall out of the basement, either-in mid-1997 the Philippine economy was forecasted to grow at more than 6% in 1998, and both the post-crisis forecasts revisions and the degree of the eventual contraction were less in the Philippines than elsewhere in Asia. Rather, the Philippine crisis 1999, nearly half of the Japanese banks that had been operating in Asia in mid-1997 had pulled out.
21. At the time of the crisis, the Philippines was the only large Southeast Asian economy under an IMF program, which may have acted as a crude signal for foreign investors to proceed with caution, despite the notion that an agreement with the IMF is sometimes regarded as something akin to a macroeconomic "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval." 22. Goldstein, Reinhart, and Kaminsky, Leading Indicators.
experience offers valuable lessons for the Philippines, the rest of Asia, and indeed, emerging markets around the world. The lesson is that policies matter: economic reform, particularly of the financial system, can have a demonstrable impact on a country's ability to weather a crisis, even if the crisis originates elsewhere and is spread by contagion. This is not to say that the Philippines is a model of economic rectitude. It is not, and the evidence presented in this paper suggests that despite a decade of reforms, the crisis that hit the Philippines in July 1997 was largely home grown. (Indeed, the home-grown crisis might have been worse had not external events short-circuited the domestic lending boom that was underway.) Worse yet, since the crisis, the country has failed to capitalize on its relatively strong performance. Ithas experienced several financial scandals and key pieces of economic reform legislation have languished in the Congress for months.
Nevertheless, the sick man merely caught a cold-he did not catch pneumonia. Had the Philippines not undertaken its financial sector reforms, the crisis undoubtedly would have been worse. Moreover, backsliding could precipitate a crisis in the future. These are lessons that policy makers both inside and outside the Philippines should take to heart. After all, if the sick man can avoid pneumonia, so can you.
